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Abstract 
People sitting on the same board have the possibility to meet and interact. Therefore, directors holding many directorships 
constitute a link between boards. Overlap in group membership allows for the flow of information between groups, and 
. In comparison to the body of literature on interlocking directorates, there are 
relatively few studies on the network of French interlocks. In our study, and to detect community structure within the French 
board network among the companies listed in the French Financial Index CAC40, we use the maximum modularity approach. 
To our knowledge, this is the only study on French interlocks that employees a maximum modularity approach. The main 
result is that the network shows a strong community structure. 
This is due to several reasons. On the one hand, we have the existence directors serving in several boards. Generally, this 
 of French listed companies is actually split into identifiable communities. On the other hand, we 
have motives to control and reduce environmental uncertainty. Overlap in group membership allows for the flow of 
interlocking among boards through common directors make easily coordination among firms. Lang and Lockhart (1990) 
justified that a firm creates a connection through an interlock to guarantee access to external resource. Our results show that 
main financial institutions are present among the large extracted communities.  
© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd.  
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Manuel Fischer. 
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1. Introduction 
The goal of this paper is to explore the interlocking directorate network among companies listed on the French 
Stock Exchange by using social network analysis which focuses on the structure of the network. In particular, we 
concentrate our study on the French companies listed in the French Financial Index CAC40. Companies are 
selected from French financial market because of the availability of the data.  
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Social networks (which were initially investigated by sociologists) have been of great importance in 
economics (Goyal, 2007; Slikker & van den Nouweland, 2001; Demange & Wooders, 2005). Networks are 
ubiquitous in social and economic phenomena. The use of methods from graph theory has allowed economic 
network theory to improve our understanding of many economic phenomena in which the embeddedness of 
individuals in their social inter-relations cannot be neglected. Social networks are formally defined as a set of 
actors or network members who are tied by one or more type of relations (Marin, 2010). There could also be 
many different types of relationships, such as collaborations, friendships, web links, citations, information flow, 
etc. (Marin, 2010). These relations represented by the edges in the network, are connecting the actors and may 
have direction (showing the flow from one actor to the other) and strength (showing how much, how often, how 
important the tie is).  
Analysts of economic organization have displayed a long and continuing interest in intercorporate relationships. 
One form of intercorporate relationship that has received a great analytical attention is directorship interlocks. A 
director can belong to several directorships in different firms. Such a director constitutes a link between the related 
firms. We say that firms that are linked in this way are interlocked. There is much research on interlocks, ranging 
from a description of what the network of interlocked firms looks like to studies on the influence of interlocks on 
firm strategy and performance. Interlocking directorates create relational spaces where information and strategies 
may not be only exchanged but also co-defined and co-created. In other words, interlocks act as communication 
channels enabling information to be shared between boards via common directors. Moreover, the network of the 
board interlocks constitutes an important organizational resource for the firm (Bazerman & Schoorman, 1983). 
Early studies on the evolution of interlocking directorates mostly relied on firm covariates and considered the 
formation of a board tie as purely dyadic event. It is often shown that groups belonging to the same community are 
suitable to share common properties or play a similar role.  
The question we focused on in this paper is whether a community structure exists among the French 
interlocking networks. Communities are cohesive subgroups of actors among whom there are relatively strong, 
direct, intense or frequent ties (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Community structures are quite common in real 
networks. Social networks often include community groups based on common location, interests, occupation, etc. 
Detecting these communities is an important condition to understand the structure of the data and consequently the 
structure of the network. Researchers have been more active in exploring community in networks (Newman & 
Girvan, 2004; Newman, 2006; Fortunato, 2010). In fact, extracting communities allow us to discern important 
 Interlocking directorates became a favorite topic for 
several reasons. First, interlocking directorates provide information to the central organizations. Second, interlocks 
provide means for communication. Third it provides a means of signaling reputation to other firms. 
We define social networks as information networks that are represented by graphs and illustrate the 
interactions between individuals or entities. In these networks, each individual is represented by a node in the 
network, and there is an edge between two nodes if an interaction occurs or a relationship exists between the two 
individuals during the observation time. In our case, we start by constructing a graph representing listed 
companies (vertices) and their connections (weighted edges for valued grapha and non weighted edges for non 
valuedb graph). This graph corresponds to the French intercorporate network. 
In a previous work, Elouaer-Mrizak (2012) calculated different vertex centrality measures: degree, 
betweenness, closeness. The use of betweenness and closeness is most powerful to have an idea about the 
intensity of the relationship among companies. Elouaer-Mriz t: first, financial 
institutions and big companies are central actors. Second, small companies tend to be connected to big companies 
in order to reduce environmental uncertainty, which is in line with Schoorman et al. (1981). Third, firms tend to 
have a banker in their boards (good signal), which is consistent with Davis and Mizruchi (1999) and Pfeffer and 
 
a For valued graph, cells in the adjacency matrix are the number of shared directors between two boards.  
b For non valued graph, cells in the adjacency matrix are equal to one if there is at least one shared director between the two boards, and equal 
to zero if there is no common director between the two boards. 
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Salanick (1978) findings. Moreover, Banks tend to have links with firms in order to reduce information 
asymmetry and to monitor the company (through dominant position in the board). It is certain that the centrality 
and position of the companies in the French Intercorporate network is important. Therefore, visualization of the 
network reveals the presence of small number of highly connected nodes (hubs) and community structure is 
evident.  
In this work, we analyze the community structure of a real world financial network, namely intercorporate 
network or board network at three observation points 1996, 2005 and 2010 and identify the community structures 
in it.  To do that, we use the modularity optimization (Newman & Girvan, 2004) method which detects 
communities by searching over possible divisions of a network for one or more that have particularly high 
modularity. This approach is one of the most popular functionsc; it attempts to measure how well a given partition 
of a network compartmentalizes its communities (Newman, 2004; 2006).  
The main contribution of our paper is to find that French board network displays a strong community structure. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section II, we present hypothesis to test, our data and the methodology 
of our work. Then in section III, we present the board network in the French context. In section IV, we present 
the analysis of the community structure and economic interpretation of the results is given. Finally, we provide 
some concluding remarks in section V. 
2. Hypothesis, Data and Method 
2.1 Hypotheses  
In our case, community detection is a task of detecting cohesive groups within the French intercorporate 
network. In addition to information about board composition, we have additional information about firms 
(nodes): type of organization and sectors they are operating in. 
When we have data about node attributes, it might be relevant to extract group of nodes that are not only 
connected in the intercorporate network but also present some particular attributes. Incorporating attribute data in 
detecting communities has not been thoroughly studied yet in the context of interlocking directorates. In order to 
check whether the attribute data determine the composition of detected communities, we will test two hypotheses 
derived from the literature. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Communities are expected to be composed of groups of industrial companies and financial firms. 
 
between firms. For example, researchers like Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) considered resource dependency as the 
greatest justification for interlocking among boards. This theory argues that interlocks are established to reduce 
uncertainty. Many researchers (like Burt, 1980; Burt, 1983; Boyd, 1990; Lang and Lockhart, 1990) justified that a 
firm creates a connection through an interlock to guarantee access to external resource. Consequently, uncertainty 
is reduced. Therefore, interlocks are viewed as a transfer device. It has been complicated to validate resource 
dependency 
be higher if an interlock offers additional information to a company.  
Based on interviews with bankers, Mizruchi (1996) and Richardson (1987) suggest that generally bankers sit 
on a board of a distressed firm (i.e. firms in financial difficulty). From the side of the distressed firm, it seeks 
additional interactions to obtain funds. Indeed, due to information asymme
external information, but have less awareness about the quality of the debtors. Therefore they will try to find 
means to reduce information asymmetry. According to Mariolis (1975), interlocking directorates is one of the 
 
c There are many computer algorithms to extract communities from a network data: modularity-based methods; spectral algorithms, dynamic 
algorithms and methods based on statistical inference (Porter, Onnela and Mucha, 2009). 
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ways that can help to reduce asymmetries of information. Having a board connection between industrial 
companies and financial firms allow banks to monitor debtors because they have access to internal information. 
Through these connections, financial f  
 Consequently, financial institutions are a central actor in the interlocking network. Resource dependency 
theory states that interlocks diminish improbability while financial control theory asserts that access to funds 
increase the greatest concern.  
Mintz and Schwartz (1985) consider the financial control theory as a stem of the resource dependence model. 
The grouping of these two theories would imply that interlocks take place more often between industrial 
companies and financial firms in particular banks. This provides industrial firms the ability of obtaining funds 
when required. Moreover, better information flows between borrowers and lenders. Following the discussion 
above, we can expect that communities will be composed of groups of industrial companies and financial firms. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Communities are expected to be composed of groups of organizations engaged into similar topics, 
and operating in same sector.  
 
The Clayton act of 1914 prohibited interlocking directorates among competing corporations but did not 
condemn the practice in general. The benefit of horizontal coordination between competitors may also be 
achieved through an indirect interlock. Horizontally interlocked firms can get advantages through communication 
regarding pricing, advertising, and research and development (Pennings,1977; Pfeffer, 1972) particularly in 
highly concentrated industries. However, these benefits are gained at the cost of the collective advantages of open 
market competition. It is justifiable to ask whether interlocks between competitors really make collusion easier. 
Studies of the U.S corporations by Pennings (1980) examined the association between industry concentration and 
horizontal ties. He found a positive association between the two. Moreover, Pennings (1980) examined whether 
such ties develop firm performance. He found a positive association between industry concentration and 
horizontal ties (interlocking directors between firms operating in the same sector). In the perspective of market 
for corporate control, Cotter et al. (1997) study interlocked directorates between bidder and target firms. Their 
ains to target shareholders and decreases 
the likelihood that a target firm receives multiple proposals. In contrast, Barucci (2006) examines the hypothesis 
of collusion finding that interlocking directorates improve the ability of the controlling shareholders to 
expropriate the minority shareholders, and extract benefits from control. 
Mizruchi (1996) concluded that the fact that within-industry interlocks continue to occur suggests that some 
interlocks may have been established with the aim of restricting competition. Interlocks are a mean for firms to 
exchange knowledge and strategy (Useem, 1984; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; 
Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). 
Following the arguments above, we can expect that communities will be composed of groups of organizations 
engaged into similar topics and operating in the same sector. 
2.2 Data 
To identify community structure in the  network of corporate boards, we use data from France. The French 
data are supplied by Dafsaliens. The data set for this study comprises lists of directors for the CAC 40 companies 
in France in 1996, 2005 and 2010.  
Our data shows two changes occurring between 1996  2005 and 2005 - 2010. The first is the size of the 
board. In 1996, the average board size is 13.59 members per board, while in 2010; it is near to 18 members per 
board. This may be the consequence of the setting of the Dualist system of governance (Directoire et Conseil de 
Surveillance) which implies a large size of boards (it may attempts 22 members). 
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Table 1: Top 40 French companies and directors, 1996, 2005 and 2010 
 
 CAC 40 
1996 2005 2010 
No. of Companies 39 40 40 
N. of Directors 530 631 610 
Average Board Size 13.59 15.77 18.125 
No. of Positions (board 
seats) 
692 773 725 
No. of Positions (seats) per 
director 
1.30 1.22 1.19 
 
Moreover, the number of positions per person decreases for CAC 40 companies between 1996 and 2010.    
Multiple directorships create "links and interlocks". Table 2 shows the number of directors who hold more than 
one position. 
 
Table 2: Number of directors/positions for Top 40 French Companies 
 
 CAC 40 
 1996 2005 2010 
1 442 535 522 
2 48 60 69 
3 21 28 14 
4 11 6 3 
5 5 2 1 
6 1 0 1 
7 1 0 0 
 1 0 0 
   
In table 2, we note that for CAC 40 companies, the number of directors holding two positions increases across 
time. The number of directors holding three positions increases from 1996 to 2005, and then decreases from 2005 
to 2010. In general, the number of directors holding 5 or more positions decreased from 1996 to 2010. 
These multiple directorships create links between boards. Consequently, a network between boards is created. 
2.3 Methodology 
Networks 
Affiliation networks are composed of two modes. The first mode is the set of agents N. The second mode is the 
set of events M. The number of agents in the network is n and the number of events is m. Interlocking directorates 
can be seen as an affiliation network. The boards of directors constitute the set of agents and the companies 
constitute the set of events. 
We can represent an affiliation network by an affiliation matrix A of size . We denote an element of 
A by  is an element of  such that   is an element of  and  is an element of 
. takes 1 if a director  sits in the board . 
 
                                                        (1) 
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Each row of A gives all the events in which an agent is taking part. The sum of a row of the affiliation matrix 
gives the number of events in which an agent is involved. Each column gives all the directors in a board.  
Agents and events can be represented separately. More precisely, each mode can be represented as a network 
by using the other mode to define the relationships. With this approach, we observe only one mode at a time. In 
terms of graph theory, an affiliation network is represented by a uni-partite graph. 
A network or a graph is described by a set of vertices (or nodes) and a set of pairs of vertices called edges 
which represent connections between vertices. Formally, a network or a graph may be denoted by  
with  the vertex set and the edge set which is a part of . We denote by n the number of nodes in a graph 
and by m the number of edges or links. Graphically nodes are drawing as points and relationships as lines 
connecting pairs of points. A graph can be represented by a matrix A called the adjacency matrix. The adjacency 
matrix has elements a
ij
equal to 1 if there is an edge from vertices and equal to 0 otherwise. Graphs can also 
be valued or non-valued. A valued graph has numbers attached to the lines that indicate the strength or frequency 
or intensity or quantity of the tie between nodes.  
If A is a symmetric matrix, the graph is undirected which means that the ties have no direction (i.e., 
). Otherwise, in directed graphs (also known as digraphs), the ties have direction and these 
lines are called arcs.   
Centrality is regarded as one of the most important and commonly used conceptual tools for exploring and 
measuring 
number of nodes that are connected to that node. Thus the degree of a node i of an undirected graph is given by 
 and the degree sequence is given by the following list  of the node degrees. 
The degree distribution is provided by  which specifies for each integer k the fraction of nodes 
such that . can be considered as the probability that a node has degree k. The average degree of the 
network is defined as the average of the degrees over all nodes in the network. However, average degree might 
not be representative, since the distribution of degrees might be skewed. For example, Bernoulli graphs of low 
density tend to have degree distributions with some positive skewness but without having very high degree nodes 
(hubs). Moreover, Bernouilli graphs of higher density tend to have symmetric degree distributions without 
skewness. 
A graph is connected if it is possible to find a path from any vertex to any other vertex of the graph. A path is 
an alternating sequence of vertices and edges, starting and ending with a vertex, in which each vertex is incident 
with the edges following and preceding it in the sequence and the number of edges is called the length of the 
path.  
Paths are useful to measure distance, i.e. how far apart vertices are in a graph. The shortest path between two 
vertices is referred to as a geodesic and its length is the geodesic distance (or simply the distance) between two 
nodes. The average geodesic distance between two vertices in a connected graph is the characteristic path length 
i to any other vertex is its eccentricity. The maximum 
eccentricity in a graph is its diameter.  
An induced subgraph, or simply a subgraph of a graph  is a graph  whose vertex set  
is a part of , and the edge set  contains exactly the edges of  with both endpoints in . 
The dyad consists of two vertices that are either adjacent, i.e. connected by an edge, or not. Sub graphs of size 
three are called triads. If the three vertices are connected, they constitute a triangle. A triangle is the smallest 
nontrivial example of a clique. Cliques are complete (or fully connected) subgraphs, in which all vertices are 
adjacent to each other. Cliques have the property that transitivity holds within the clique; i.e. if vertex i is a 
neighbor of vertex j and j is a neighbor of vertex h, h is also a neighbor of i.  
Components are maximally connected subgraphs. If a network is not connected, the vertex set can be 
partitioned into components  with  nodes ( ). Components are 
connected and they are not part of a larger connected sub-network.  
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To detect communities in the network, we must consider each component separately.  A subset  is 
called a community if the density of links internal to  is much larger than the density of links connecting  to 
the rest of the network. 
Community structure 
In this paragraph, we introduce the basic terminology on communities and methods of community detectiond. 
The detection of community groups, or modules, within networks is one of the great current interests. Roughly 
speaking, a community group is a portion of the network whose members are more tightly linked than to other 
members of the network. A multitude of approaches (Clauset, Newman & Moore, 2004; Girvan & Newman, 
2002; Goldshtein & Koganov, 2006; Hastings, 2006; Newman & Girvan, 2004; Reichardt & Bornholdt, 2006) 
have been considered to explore this concept.  
 
Fig. 1. Community Structure, Source: Newman (2004) 
 
Properties of the sub networks may differ from the aggregate properties of the network as a whole, e.g., 
modules in the World Wide Web are sets of topically related web pages. Thus, identification of community 
groups within a network is a first step towards understanding the homogeneous substructures of the network. 
Methods for identifying community groups can be adapted to different types of networks (for bipartite 
networks for example, see Barber, 2007). These methods are relevant for our study of the boardroom networks, 
allowing us to examine the community structure in the board networks.  
To identify communities, we consider the modularity, introduced by Newman and Girvan (2004). Newman 
and Girvan (2004) proposed the first community detection approach using the social network analysis techniques 
and opened a new setting for community detection algorithms. Their method is a divisive hierarchical clustering 
algorithm which iteratively removes the edge with highest betweenness to obtain the community structure of the 
network. The betweenness of an edge could be computed as the number of shortest paths running through that 
edge. High betweenness is a sign for bridges in the network, which are edges connecting different communities, 
illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
 
dSee Newman (2003), Newman and Girvan (2004), Boccaletti et al. (2006), Fortunato and Castellano (2009), Fortunato (2010). 
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Fig. 2. Edge Betweenness: edges connecting different communities have high betweenness. In this figure, the thickness of edges represents 
their betweenness. The edge between two communities has the highest betweenness as all the shortest paths between any pair of vertices, 
which are in different communities, have to run through this edge. 
 
Modularity makes intuitive notions of community groups precise by comparing network edges to those of a 
null model. To identify communities within networks, there are different methods (Fortunato, 2010). The 
different methods analyze graph structure in different ways but in each case, the strength of the different graph 
partitions they suggest are evaluated by comparing the distribution edges with those expected in random or null 
model with the same structural characteristics (Modularity). 
The modularity Q is proportional to the difference between the number of edges within communities  and 
those for a null model: 
According Newman and Girvan (2004), and for a given network with vertex set  and a partition  
(i.e., ), the modularity is given by: 
                                                                 (2) 
The degree of nodes are  respectively. L is the number of links.  is obtained by summing up, 
through all the sets  , the difference between the actual number of links internal to the set  and the 
value expected if links were created randomly, regardless of the existing communities (the NULL Model) 
. Consequently,  is large (it tends to 1, due to the normalization) when the density of links into the 
communities  is larger in comparison to a random distribution of links in the network. 
The standard choice for the null model constrains the degree distribution for the vertices to match the degree 
distribution in the actual network. Random graph models of this sort are obtained (Chung and Lu, 2002) by 
putting an edge between vertices i and j at random, with the constraint that on average the degree of any vertex i 
is .  
The null model choice is that Q = 0 when all vertices are in the same community. The goal is to find a division 
of the vertices into communities such that the modularity Q is maximal. 
Finding the partition which maximizes the modularity is NP-hard (Brandes et al., 2006) and therefore many 
approximation algorithms have been proposed, see Fortunato (2010), Porter et al. (2009), Schaeffer (2007) for 
comprehensive surveys. In this paper, we will use, in addition to the edge betwenness algorithm (Newman and 
Girvan, 2004), two other different algorithms: 
  Latapy, 2006), is based on the idea that a small random walk will stay 
leading outside. 
 The second one, Fast Greedy (Clauset et al., 2004), is a greedy optimization algorithm for modularity: 
each node is initially in its own community and then, at every step, the algorithm groups two 
communities in order to maximize the gain of modularity. 
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Evolution of Communities 
 
One important element of our study is the availability of the data on three period of time (1996,2005 and 
2010). To study the evolution of these communities over time, it is important to define different forms of 
transition of these communities (Sitaram Asur et al., 2001) 
Continuation: A community continues from one period to a next period (period=1996, 2005,2010), if it 
remains same from one time to another. We do not impose the constraint that the edges sets should be the same. 
The central motivation behind this is that if certain nodes are always part of the same community, any 
information supplied to one node will eventually reach the others. 
Dissolution: A community is said to have dissolved if none of the vertices in the cluster are in the same cluster 
in the next period. Logically, a dissolve indicates the lack of contact or interactions between some nodes in a 
particular time period.  
Formation: A new community is said to have been formed if none of the nodes in the community were 
grouped together at the previous period. Intuitively, a formation indicates the creation of a new community. 
Merging: Two different communities are marked as merged if there exist a community in the next period that 
contains at least k%e of the nodes belonging to these two clusters.  
Intuitively, it implies that new interactions have been created between nodes which previously were part of 
different communities. This caused k% of nodes in the two original communities to join the new community. 
Note that, in an ideal or complete merge, with k = 100, all nodes in the two original clusters are found in the same 
community in the next timestamp.  
Splitting: A single community is marked as split if k% of nodes from this cluster, are present in 2 different 
clusters in the next period. Intuitively, a split signifies that the interactions between certain nodes are broken and 
not carried over to the current period, causing the nodes to part ways and join different communities.  
3. The French Board Network 
3.1 The  
Multiple directorships create "links and interlocks". Table 1 above shows the number of directors who hold 
Interlocking directorates can be defined as companies that "interlock" their boards by common or shared 
directors. An important question arises: How should one draw a graph to represent the network resulting from 
common directors? Indeed, there are two units of analysis either boards or directors. One could treat the "boards" 
as the basic unit of the analysis and form a graph whose vertices represent boards and whose edges represent 
shared directors (board graph). Alternatively, one could make a graph whose vertices represent directors and 
whose edges represent shared board memberships (director graph). There is no obvious way to make a choice 
among them. Theref 
represent membership of the former in the latter. 
In a bipartite network, directors and boards correspond to two sets respectively ND and NB and a link between 
two nodes  and  exists when the director  sits in the board . Board network and director network are 
projections of a bipartite network. 
In this section, we analyze the French corporate board network for CAC40 companies listed in the French 
Stock Market in three years: 1996, 2005 and 2010.  
 
e As Sitaram Asur et al. (2001), we used k values of 30 and 50 in our case. 
f For an excellent discussion of graphs, their representation, manipulation and application to the social sciences, see Wasserman and Faust 
(1994) 
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In this paragraph, we are interested in the network characteristics (Table 3) for better understanding 
connections and its mechanism of formation. The basic properties which characterize connectivity within a 
network are connected to the concept of degree. 
Table 3. Statistics on the two mode network of boards and directors for CAC40 companies 
 1996 2005 2010 
Boards Directors Boards Directors Boards Directors 
Number of Nodes 40 530 40 625 40 610 
Average degree 17,225 1,3 19,2 1,229 18,125 1,189 
Min degree 1 1 12 1 11 1 
Max degree 36 9 26 5 28 6 
 
The projection of the two mode network on the set of boards generates the board network, which is fully 
described by the symmetric  connectivity matrix. The CAC40 board network has a big component in 
1996. In 2005 and 2010, the graph is connected. In 1996, the network is composed by 5 components one of them 
is a giant component as it has 34 nodes which is 85% of the total. The other components are isolate vertices.  
Table 4. Global metrics for the CAC40 board network 
 1996 2005 2010 
Components 5 1 1 
Isolates 4 0 0 
Density 0.2470 0.2615 0.1974 
Degree Centralization 0.2667 0.3441 0.0830 
Betweeness Centrality 0.0944 0.0963 0.0927 
Clustering Coefficient 0.590 0.343 0.387 
 
Figures 2, 3 and 4 present the degree distribution of the networks. For 1996, we limit our attention to the giant 
component. 
Table 5. Statistics on the CAC 40 board network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1996 2005 2010 
Boards Directors Boards Directors Boards Directors 
Number of Nodes 40 491 40 625 40 610 
Average degree 11,35 26,24 8,15 23,18 6,4 21,38 
Min degree 1 7 1 11 1 10 
Max degree 20 173 19 100 16 105 
Average distance 1,788 2,516 1,90 2,829 2,244 3,106 
Diameter 5 5 4 5 5 5 
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The diameter is the maximum of the shortest path distances between two connected nodes of the network. It is 
the maximum distance between two connected nodes. If the diameter is 1, each node considered is directly related 
to all the others. If it is of 2, one needs a maximum of 1 intermediary to contact the other nodes of the network, 
etc. 
If the diameter is small, then each node can be connected to any other by a short chain of social relations: it is 
a "small worldg". On the contrary, if the diameter is large, the nodes are very distant from each other. A diameter 
of 1 corresponds to a complete network. A second way of detecting the effect of small world would be to 
calculate the average of the geodesic distancesh or minimal distances: 
 
                                                                           (3) 
 
Where  is the geodesic distance between nodes i and j and N is the number of nodes. If the network is a 
. 
Table 4 shows that the diameter is weak in CAC40 board network. It is quite constant and equal to 5 for the 
most point of times (1996, 2005 and 2010). Boards are never separated by more than 4 intermediaries in the 
board network. To illustrate, for example, Enron directors were sitting on the boards of 10 others of the Fortune 
1000 American companies, including Compaq, Eli Lilly, Lockheed Martin, and Motorola. The administrators of 
these ten boards were participating in boards of 49 other Fortune 1000 companies. From Enron, 648 boards could 
be achieved in only four maximum degrees of separation. In terms of people, 95 administrators were directly 
related to the Enron Directors through boards of directors, and 482 others were far from two arcs of the Enron 
Board. 
For the CAC40 board network, the average of the geodesic distances varies from 1.788 to 2.244. And for the 
CAC40 director network, the average of the geodesic distances varies from 2.516 to 3.106. 
3.2 The node degree distribution 
The degree of a node in a network is the number of connections or edges the node has to other nodes: 
                                                                                    (4) 
Where equals 1 if there is a connection between nodes i and j, and equals 0 otherwise. The node degrees 
distributions for the 40 firms (Figures 3, 4, 5) show some heterogeneity between nodes: some firms with a great 
number of common directors and some with only some connections. The distribution does not follow a normal 
one. Thus, the networks formation is not purely random.  Links between companies are not random; they are the 
outcome of a complex interaction among firms. 
 
 
 
g One speaks about .small world.(small world) when each individual of the network can be connected to any other individual by a short chain 
of social relations including at maximum 5 other nodes (or six degrees of separations). It is Milgram (1967) who put the assumption of the 
small world. He had asked 296 people to forward a .le to a target person by using only intermediaries who knew each other. The targeted 
person was a stockbroker residing at Boston (known information of the participants). At the end of the game, 64 files arrived at the objective 
individual. The remainder corresponds to chains made incomplete by the abandonment of a participant. The average length of the chains is 5.2 
intermediaries. This small number of intermediaries excited the curiosity of the researchers who formulated the assumption of "small world". 
With six intermediaries, one can connect two people who do not know each other and thus reach anyone in the world. 
h The geodesic indicates the shortest way, or one of the shortest ways if there are some several, between two points of a space equipped with 
metric. 
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Fig. 3. Degree distribution 96 
 
Fig. 4. Degree distribution 05 
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Fig. 5. Degree distribution 10 
 
3.3 Communities in the network 
A community is a set of nodes such that the density of internal connections is stronger than the density of 
connections towards outside. The goal is thus to find a partition  of nodes in communities checking 
this definition. The visualization of the graph allows us to detect groups by characteristic. Community analysis 
applied to the networks (for 1996, we consider the giant component) shows a quite strong community structure. 
Table 5 presents the number of communities for each network. In order to calculate, Q values, we used three 
methods: edge betweenness, walk trap and fast greedy algorithm. 
 
Table 6. Number of communities for each network 
  1996 2005 2010 
Edgebetweenness Number of communities 16 11 14 
Modularity (Best Split) 0.02139615 0.145581 0.1836524 
Walktrap Number of communities 4 10 8 
Modularity (Best Split) 0.2431313 0.2161188 0.2726851 
Fastgreedy algorithm Number of communities 3 5 4 
Modularity (Best Split) 0.2656191 0.2985871 0.3221032 
 
Recall that modularity measures the strength of the determined communities based on the relative number of 
intra-group connections versus extra-group connections. We observe that in 1996, modularity has a low value 
(0.0214). Good partitions give large positive values of . In fact, the way the modularity was defined (as it has 
been normalized),  ranges between  and .  means that all vertices of the graph are assigned to the 
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same community. At the other extreme, if we have a partition with each community being a singleton, then  
turns out to be negative. In particular, if for any partition of a graph, modularity is found out to be non-positive, 
then this graph has no community structure (in fact, such a graph would show a strong multipartite structure, in 
the sense that it would be decomposed to certain subgraphs with very few internal edges and many edges lying 
between them). If modularity takes large positive values (close to 1), then this indicates that the graph is 
decomposed to communities i.e. more edges in the graph within these communities than what would be expected 
by chance. 
When edge betweenness algorithm considered, values of modularity are increasing across time among the 
CAC40 board companies (from 0.0214 in 1996 to 0.1837 in 2010). In 1996, almost all the boards are allocated to 
the same communities. However, in 2005, the modularity value is medium. This means that the structure of the 
board network among French companies is not random, and communities start to emerge. According to 
hypotheses 1 and 2, communities are expected to be composed of groups of organizations operating in the same 
sector and composed of groups of industrial and financial firms. Our results confirm these two hypotheses. To 
illustrate these findings, we examine the communities in each year (see appendix 1) we see that, for example: in 
the community {Société Générale, Total, Saint Gobain, PPR}, we find that Société Générale and PPR are in the 
same community. In fact Société Générale holds 6.86% in the capital of Total.  Moreover, Michelin and Renault 
are in the same community. Michelin and Renault both are industrial companies and are operating in two 
complementary industries.  
Community structures identify the existence of forms of coalitions among CAC40 companies. Control is one 
of the most extreme forms of influence, which is the power to maneuver the decisions of a company towards a 
direction. The board network represents the connections among companies (or directors). Directors are the actors 
who, via co-membership on boards, interact and communicate with one another. Corporate board meetings are 
the events that bring directors together, into face-to-face contact. Collective decision making of directors renders 
the corporate board an actor in its own. Directors also speak on behalf of the corporation to other corporations, 
and, on occasion, to the public as well. CEOs will often serve on the boards of other corporations, in part as a 
matter of prestige, as this illustrates that their advice is valued outside of their home corporation. Also, this is a 
way of obtaining valuable, and perhaps sensitive and privileged, business intelligence, and as a means of 
extending their own social networks. 
The network analysis gave us abundant information on the network of interlocking directorates. The positions 
of banks in the network and the relations between bank and industry are significant. The finance capital theory 
expects that banks are involved in strong and multiple interlocks. In 2010, we obtain 14 communities (according 
to the edgebetweenness criteria). Among them we find: {Alstom, Axa, BNP Paribas, Bouygues, Carrefour, Eads, 
Lafarge, Lagardere}; {PPR, Société Générale, Saint Gobain, Total}; {Alcatel Lucent; Cap Gemini; Crédit 
Agricole}. Interestingly, the main French banks (BNP Paribas, Société Générale, Crédit Agricole) are in the 
three big communities which is in line with Elouaer-  that states thirty percent of the most 
connected firms are financial institutions. In fact, according to Dooley (1996), financial interlocks occur for 
several reasons. First, companies that are in financial difficulty tend to form a close association with one or more 
financial houses. Second, banks find it advantageous to be connected with large firms through electing company 
 as this may attract large deposits as well as secure a reliable customer for 
bank loans. Third, these financial interlocks also arise from the trust operations of banks.  Moreover, the location 
of a firm in a network directly impacts access to information. Centrality in a network can be seen as the 
importance of a firm in that network. Betweenness measure may provide an idea about the importance of a 
company in the network. Boards that are not directly connected might depend on another board if it lies on a path 
connecting them. If a board lies on many paths connecting different components in a network then it has a high 
betweenness centrality. From this side, we can suppose that agents among communities are looking for 
intermediary positions. However, modularity values derived with the edge betweeness values are not high in 
comparison with walk trap and the fast greedy algorithms. Finally we can conclude that the French board network 
shows a quite strong community structure. 
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One another contribution of our work consists in exploring the evolution of the community structure of the 
French intercorporate network from 1996 to 2010.  
The first point is that in 1996, we find two big communities of 9 actors. In contrast, in 2005 and 2010, we had, 
at one hand a split of these two big clusters and on the other hand, there is a creation of other communities. It is 
important to note that in the communities and from 1996 to 2010, there are groups of nodes that belong to the 
same community {PPR+Société Générale+Saint Gobain+Total} and {BNP Paribas+Bouygues+Lagardère}. 
Consequently, we can conclude that we have a strong cohesion between these nodes.  In 1996, we  find 
{Accor+Air Liquide+Alcatel+Aventis+Bouygues+Compagnie Bancaire+Lagardère+LVMH+Paribas}.  On May 
2000, Compagnie Bancaire and BNP merged together and we obtain BNP Paribas. Moreover, in 1996 we had 14 
nodes that are not involved in any community. In next periods, 2005 and 2010, these nodes appear: indeed they 
belong to a community but were not present in any community in the previous period (1996). This simple event 
indicates the introduction of a company to a network.  
In contrast, in 2005 and 2010, several nodes disappear. It means that in 1996 they were when they are found in 
a community but are not present in any community in the period. This indicates the departure of a company from 
a network.  
To conclude, we remark that the main French banks continue to exist with the same nodes over the three 
periods. Our findings illustrate the important role of banks in the French intercorporate network among CAC 40 
companies. As mentioned previously, interlocks between banks and industrial companies are considered in the 
bank-control model. These links may guarantee to the lenders a certain control over the companies in which they 
invest (bank control thesis; Scott 1985 cited in Höpner et al., 2003). We remark that the main French banks 
continue to exist with the same nodes over the three periods. 
4. Conclusion 
French board networks reveal particular properties in comparison to those in other countries. According to 
Windolf (2002), among the 374 main firms in France, fewer are interconnected; isolates represent a bigger share 
(43%) than in Germany (32%), and mostly than in the United States (14%) and in the United Kingdom (8%). 
However interconnected firms are more integrated than the other countries. The share of firms with ties is higher 
(4.92) than in Germany (4.21), in the United States (1.89) and in the United Kingdom (1.53). These firms do not 
only exhibit more interlocks, but also more multiple interlocks among each other. The proportion of multiple 
relationships (20%) is rather high. Moreover interlocks in France seem to be more centralized, as the firm with 
the highest number of interlocks in these countries is French. In brief, the French corporate network has the most 
cohesive core (Comet & Pizzaro, 2011). Consequently, extracting communities in the French board network is 
interesting.  
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the first effort to examine the community structure among 
interlocking directorates of French companies.  Our results contribute to the growing literature on interlocking 
directorates by showing that intercorporate network among CAC40 French companies reveal a structure with 
communities. Several facts may give this result, such control and environmental uncertainty.  
Overlap in group membership allows for the flow of information between groups, and perhaps coordination of 
rough common 
directors, make the coordination between firms easier. Interlocks allow firms and/or financial institutions to 
reduce dependence on formal company communications, and/or co-opt, control, and monitor other firms 
(Haunschild & Beckman, 1998). Interlocks facilitate to firms obtaining valuable information about other firms, as 
the primary function of interlocks is to manage dependence through cooptation and control (Haunschild & 
Beckman, 1998). Interlocking directorates can therefore be seen as devices of power and influence for one 
company over another. 
Our findings are in line with these facts since we find main financial institutions among the large extracted 
communities. Moreover, diversification strategies are often associated with control and coordination problems. 
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The purpose of horizontal interlocking would be to coordinate firms within the group. Horizontal interlocks 
contribute to maintain and promote transactions between group members, and create a communication network. 
As a further research direction, we should extend our work to companies listed in the French financial index 
SBF 250 which includes 250 companies and compare the two networks with the ownership networks.  Moreover, 
we should study the evolution of our communities in more details as in Sitaram Asur et al. (2001). 
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Appendix 
A.1. Communities in CAC 40  board network in 1996 
 
 
99 Sana Elouaer-Mrizak and Marc Chastand /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  79 ( 2013 )  82 – 100 
A.2. Communities in CAC 40  board network in 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100   Sana Elouaer-Mrizak and Marc Chastand /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  79 ( 2013 )  82 – 100 
A.3. Communities in CAC 40  board network in 2010 
 
 
 
